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One CA Podcast is here to inspire anyone interested in traveling to work with a partner nation’s people and leadership to forward U.S. foreign policy. We bring in current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences and give recommendations for working the ”last three feet” of foreign relations. The show is sponsored by the Civil Affairs Association.
Episodes
Tuesday Sep 18, 2018
Sunday Sep 02, 2018
Sunday Sep 02, 2018
Norm Cotton, retired Colonel of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) discusses his career in Civil Affairs and current work for the IDA on Department of Defense policy.
Recommended reading from Colonel Cotton includes: A Bell for Adano, by John Hersey, and Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward), by Stephen L. Melton
Sunday Aug 19, 2018
Sunday Aug 19, 2018
Please welcome Kevin Melton, Senior Civil-Military Transition Assistance Specialist, USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, to discuss OTI's structure, functions, and connection to Civil Affairs. He highlights the Stabilization Assistance Review, a report drafted by DoD, State, and USAID.
Tuesday Aug 07, 2018
Tuesday Aug 07, 2018
Welcome to the One CA Podcast.
Today, we welcome Dr. Larry Hufford from St. Mary's University of San Antonio, TX, who discusses the current situation in Northern Ireland, why lasting peace is so difficult, and what effect Brexit might have.
Recorded and edited by Sarah Kelly. Music "Kowloon Park Singers" by Robert Gilks
Sunday Jul 22, 2018
Sunday Jul 22, 2018
SFC Valor Breez and CPT Jarrett Redman discuss their winning paper titled, "Beyond Hearts & Minds: Transforming the Civil Affairs Regiment to Consolidate Gains in 21st Century Warfare." The paper was published in Volume 4 of 2017-2018 Civil Affairs Issue Papers published by PKSOI. Their co-author was SFC Sean Acosta.
Sunday Jul 01, 2018
Sunday Jul 01, 2018
John Stefula, Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve, discusses the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and the implications of their mission for Civil Affairs. He also talks about the value of company and field-grade CA members sharing their lessons learned from training and deployments.
Call for Papers by the Civil Affairs Association.
Thursday Jun 14, 2018
Thursday Jun 14, 2018
Michael Schwille, Major in the U.S. Army Reserve, discusses his growth in Civil Affairs, experiences in Iraq and Djibouti, and how civilian work with the RAND Corporation relates to CA.
Find Major Schwille on LinkedIn.
Check out the Civil Affairs Association online for a Call for Papers and upcoming events.
Friday Jun 01, 2018
Friday Jun 01, 2018
Welcome to the Once CA Podcast.
Please welcome Gonul Tol, the founding director of the Middle East Institute's Center for Turkish Studies, who discusses Turkey and Turkish relations in the region.
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Transcript
00:01:29 SPEAKER_00
What Turkey is trying to do in Syria today is curbing the influence of the Syrian Kurds and that has become in fact the backbone of not only Turkey's Syria strategy but Turkey's regional strategy.
00:02:06 SPEAKER_04
This is John McElligot, your host for this episode of the 1CA podcast. We're joined today by Gunal Tol. She's the founding director of the Middle East Institute's Center for Turkish Studies. She's also an adjunct professor at George Washington University's Institute for Middle East Studies. After three years of field research in Germany and the Netherlands, she wrote her dissertation on the radicalization of the Turkish Islamist movement Miliskurus in Western Europe. She was also an adjunct professor at the College of International Security Studies at the National Defense University. She has taught courses on Islamist movements in Western Europe, Turkey, world politics, and the Middle East. She has written extensively on Turkey -U .S. relations, Turkish domestic politics, and foreign policy in the Kurdish issue. She's also a frequent media contributor. Ma 'am, thank you very much for being here.
00:02:58 SPEAKER_00
Thanks for having me.
00:02:59 SPEAKER_04
We wanted to talk about what you're focusing on these days. What are you writing about?
00:03:04 SPEAKER_00
Well, mostly about Turkey and what Turkey is doing in Syria. Recently, Turkey launched a military incursion into the northwestern Kurdish enclave. It's called Afrin. And it's a major concern, especially for the U .S. and the U .S. military, because the U .S. is there working with the Syrian Kurdish militia, and that's called the YPG, and Turkey at the moment is attacking the YPG forces in Afrin. And recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to move into Manbij. Manbij is another northern Syrian town that is under the control of U .S.-backed Kurdish forces. And there are also around 2 ,000 U .S. Special Operations Forces in Manbij. So if Erdogan delivers on his threat and moves into Manbij, that could potentially... There is a high risk of a clash between the US and Turkey, so that's what we mostly focus on these days.
00:04:09 SPEAKER_04
Why do you think the average American should care about what's happening in Turkey right now?
00:04:13 SPEAKER_00
I think mainly because what the United States is trying to do in Syria is it's trying to confront the radical Islamic State in Syria. And it's working with the Kurdish militia there. And what Turkey is doing in Syria, the Syria policy that Turkey pursues,
00:04:32 SPEAKER_01
is doing in Syria, the Syria policy that
00:04:37 SPEAKER_00
has a direct impact on what the U .S. is trying to do in Syria. So what Turkey is doing in Syria is important for the U .S. national security interest.
00:04:48 SPEAKER_04
I've read a lot about that the last couple of years. And the Syrian civil war has been going on now for quite a while. What do you think would be the turning point over the next six months or year, considering other players like Russia as well?
00:05:03 SPEAKER_00
Well, it's very difficult. In 2011, when the uprising started, many experts as well as intelligence organizations, they thought that Assad only had six months because he didn't have the backing of the majority of the population. He was only backed by the Alevi minority. So people thought that he could not survive longer than six months, and that hasn't really happened. So it's really difficult to predict what will happen next in Syria. But what I see is because of Russian involvement in Syria,
00:05:42 SPEAKER_00
of Russian involvement in Syria, as you know, Russia militarily involved in Syria in 2015. And since then, I think it turned the tide in the Syrian conflict. So the regime gained a lot of territory, captured territory from the Islamic State and from the opposition. So the regime at the moment, the Assad regime, is quite confident that it will control all the territory that it used to control before the Syrian conflict started. So I think at this point, I'm not... hopeful that the Syrian opposition can put up a real fight. So that means probably with Russian backing and the backing of Iran and the Shia militias there, the regime is going to win. Again, they now, they captured a lot of territory and through diplomatic means as well, not just through military means. They have European countries, I think the majority of the international community now resign themselves to the fact that Assad will not go. So he is here to stay. And the main priority of international actors is to contain the Islamic State. And that's why toppling the regime is not a priority anymore. So when you combine that with the fact... that the regime is gaining military on the ground, I think the picture gets clearer that the regime will not be toppled. And also we have to talk about the state of the Syrian opposition. They were in a better place a few years ago now. Their international backers are not supporting them. They are not providing them logistical aid, financial aid anymore.
00:07:33 SPEAKER_01
financial aid
00:07:36 SPEAKER_00
They are very divided and the international community has their own suspicions because there are many radical groups inside the Free Syrian Army. So all these factors make it very difficult for the Syrian opposition to put up a real fight against the Assad regime. So that's why if I had to predict, I would say that the regime would probably win this war.
00:08:04 SPEAKER_04
It's connected to something you presented in 2015. You spoke at an MEI event and discussed Turkey's two objectives in Syria. The first was toppling Assad regime, which you've mentioned is unlikely now. And the second was preventing a Kurdish corridor along Turkey's southern border by marginalizing the Syrian Kurds. Could you talk about the background of the group Syria? Who are the Syrian Kurds and what's the connection to Turkey?
00:08:33 SPEAKER_00
Well, as you know, the Kurds are actually the biggest minority that do not have a state. There are around 30 million Kurds in the region, and they are spread across different countries, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. And they are a marginalized group because in the countries that they live in, they are suppressed. In Turkey, for instance, 20 % of the population is of Kurdish origin. And yet they are still struggling. In fact, they've been waging a war against the Turkish state since the 1980s.
00:08:40 SPEAKER_01
are around
00:09:05 SPEAKER_00
So they want more political, social, economic rights. The Kurds in Syria, they are at a better place because since the first Gulf War, thanks to the no -fly zone established by the United States and the international community, they have an autonomous region. What started as a de facto autonomous region became a real autonomous region after the second Gulf War. So they have their own military, they have their own parliament, they have their own resources. So they are the ones, the Iraqi Kurds are the ones who have come closest to becoming a state. And in fact... They held a referendum in September 2017, an independence referendum. Unfortunately, it failed because all international actors, including Turkey and the United States, were opposed to the referendum. So they have become very fragile. Their project for independence is quite fragile at the moment. And the Syrian Kurds, again, they are oppressed by the regime. And until the Syrian conflict started, they did not even have ID cards. So if you do not have an ID card, you can't benefit from the services that the state is offering. So they have been very marginalized as well. And in Iran too, there is a sizable Kurdish minority. And in all these countries, in Turkey for instance, there is an organization that is considered a terrorist organization by Turkey. the US and the European Union, that is called the PKK. And it has its sister organizations in Syria, in Iraq, and in Iran. Their headquarters are in Iraq. So Turkey has been waging a war against the PKK. And it considers the YPG. The YPG is the group that the United States is working with, cooperating. They have become... an important ally in the fight against the Islamic State. So the United States considers the PKK as a terrorist organization, but technically the YPG, which is the PKK's Syrian offshoot, is not considered a terrorist organization by the United States. So that loophole created a lot of tension between Turkey and the United States. And Turkey thinks that there is no difference between the YPG and the PKK. What do you think?
00:11:43 SPEAKER_04
do you think?
00:11:44 SPEAKER_00
Well, I think they are the exact same organization. They share the same ideology. It's a Marxist -Leninist ideology. And they have the same leadership. And in terms of micromanaging daily affairs. The YPG might have some autonomy from the PKK, but I think they are the exact same organization. So that's why Turkey has been quite concerned about the fact that after the Syrian conflict started, the YPG started establishing this autonomous region in northern Syria. So that's why... Turkey's number one priority in Syria has become not toppling the Assad regime, but confronting the YPG and curbing its influence in Syria. So why does Turkey even care about the YPG?
00:12:40 SPEAKER_04
why does Turkey even care about the YPG? Do they hold strategically significant land or could? Economic interests? Why couldn't Turkey just forget about it, leave them alone? It's a very good question.
00:12:52 SPEAKER_00
leave them alone? It's a very good question. And you know, in Washington, D .C., we... talk about all different other things, but we don't actually ask this question. So it's a very important question. I personally believe that the YPG does not pose a threat to Turkey. The PKK does, obviously. The PKK is a terrorist organization and has been waging a war against Turkey since 1980s, but not the YPG. But Turkey considers it as a national security threat because the YPG started So in 2011, and that was when the Syrian conflict started, at the time Turkey had very close ties to the Assad regime. President Erdogan was friends with President Assad. They even vacationed together and Turkey had invested heavily in Syria. Visa restrictions were lifted. The two countries held joint cabinet meetings. Turkey, there were many Turkish companies, construction companies operating in Syria and Syria became Turkey's gateway to the rest of the region. So Turkey had very close ties, cultivated close ties to Syria. So that's why when the Syrian conflict started, Turkey did not immediately join the anti -Assad camp, thinking that Erdogan had leverage over Assad and Erdogan thought that he could in fact force Assad to carry out reforms. But of course that did not happen. So after a few months, Turkey came to terms with the fact that Assad was not going to leave and joined the anti -Assad camp. And when that happened, and Turkey did not only join the anti -Assad camp, but it became an organizational hub for the Syrian opposition. So in retaliation, the Assad regime allowed all the PKK leadership. who have been living in exile in Europe to come back to the country and basically gave a free hand to establish an autonomous region in northern Syria. And that's when Turkey's threat perception was heightened. Turkey thought that Assad is going to allow the Kurds to establish a continuous autonomous region which might link... to the Iraqi Kurdish region, so the Kurds will have access to the Mediterranean. And that's a major threat for Turkey because they think that if there is a continuous Kurdish autonomous region that has access to the Mediterranean right there, right on my southern border, then maybe my own Kurdish community will want similar things. So that's why Turkey is... turned its attention to the Kurds in Syria. So initially Turkey's number one focus in Syria was toppling the regime. Now it's become a secondary and maybe it's not even on Turkey's agenda anymore. So what Turkey is trying to do in Syria today is curbing the influence of the Syrian Kurds and that has become in fact the backbone of not only Turkey's Syria strategy but Turkey's regional strategy. Turkey is trying to do that in Iraq with the Iraqi Kurds. And that has shaped Turkey's relations with Russia. That's the main reason for the Turkey -Russia rapprochement. That's the main reason for Turkey -Iran rapprochement. That's the main reason for the problematic relationship between Turkey and the US. So that fear of Kurdish separatism has become the backbone of Turkey's foreign policy.
00:16:39 SPEAKER_04
It's interesting you talk about the connection there with Russia as well, because I wanted to ask you the regional power plays. And I was reading Peter Zeihan's predictions for Turkey and focused on three areas. One was conquer or ally with Romania and Bulgaria. Two, secure oil from Kurdish Iraq or Azerbaijan. Three, show interest in possibly retaking the Crimean Peninsula to the effect of being recognized by Russia as a regional power in that lower Danube area. and securing national gas exports. So there's the southern border that Turkey is focusing on heavily. But what else do you see going on with its neighbors? And where else is drawing, what other areas are drawing Turkey's focus right now? Well,
00:17:27 SPEAKER_00
again, I think the fear of Kurdish separatism is number one on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. And that's driving its relations with Russia. with Iran, with Baghdad, with Syria, and it's even creating tensions with the Gulf countries, and Turkey had close ties with, especially with Saudi Arabia. So currently with Russia, I think Turkey was so frustrated with the United States that the US chose to work with the YPG that it turned to Russia in Syria, because it was obvious. For a long time, the expectation in Turkey was that it was the Obama administration decision. So a few folks within the Obama administration made that decision. But once Obama is out of the picture, President Trump would have a different policy and would have a more favorable policy. So that was the expectation in Turkey. But the opposite has happened. Trump, in fact, took a major step and decided that the Pentagon would directly arm the YPG. So that was a step that Obama was reluctant to take. So that's why Turkey's hopes were dashed. So after Turkey realized that Trump would not change US's close cooperation with the YPG, Turkey figured that it had to work with Russia, it had to work with Iran, and it had to work with the Syrian regime. Because the main thinking behind that strategy was that Assad does not want an autonomous Kurdish region. He wants to control the entire country. And Iran, it has its own Kurdish minority. So they are as well vulnerable to a Kurdish autonomy project. So they might work with Turkey. And Russia, if Turkey delivers on other issues. that Russia might be willing to curb the Kurdish influence in Syria. So that was the expectation. And that's why Turkey cultivated close ties with these countries, with Russia, Iran, and even with the regime. So now they have become Astana partners. So they established a mechanism in Astana. Russia is leading the diplomatic efforts there. It's trying to find a solution to the Syrian conflict. And Turkey has been signing deals to create de -escalation zones in Syria. So through those de -escalation zones, in fact, the Assad regime is gaining more territory. But Turkey is okay with that as long as all these countries, Russia, Iran and the Assad regime, turn a blind eye to what Turkey is doing in Syria against the Kurds. So that's why I'm saying that its fear of Kurdish separatism has become the number one driver of Turkey's relations with its neighbors. With Russia there are several other issues, important factors. Turkey is dependent on Russian energy. And also in 2015, you might remember this, Turkey downed a Russian jet because Russia violated Turkish. airspace and that became a turning point and it was a wake -up call for Turkey because right after that incident Russia deployed S -400 missiles in Syria and also imposed economic sanctions that hurt Turkish economy a lot and economy is President Erdoğan's soft belly and took other measures that really made Turkey quite vulnerable so Turkey realized that that it could not effort to alienate Russia. So, since then, Turkey has been trying to cultivate closer ties. For instance, Turkey is trying to purchase S -400 missiles from Russia, and that has pissed NATO off for obvious reasons. And many in Washington are talking about a strategic shift in Turkey's foreign policy direction. a shift away from the West and NATO to Russia. I don't think that is the case, but Turkey is working closely with Russia. With Iran, again, it's working closely in Syria with Iran, but I don't think that is a strategic shift either, because there are also issues that are dividing these countries. They are not on the same page on everything, and they are competing for influence in Iraq. in Syria, in the region in general. So there are limits to their cooperation. In Iraq, Turkey had very problematic relations with Baghdad, with the central government, for several reasons. For many years, Turkey had very close ties with the Iraqi Kurds and signed energy deals without the approval of Baghdad that angered Baghdad. The Baghdad officials thought that Turkey was meddling in internal affairs. Now, Turkey has tense relations with the Iraqi Kurds and trying to cultivate closer ties with Baghdad. But there are just too many suspicions in Baghdad towards Turkey. And with the European countries and the US, I talked about the problems in Turkey -US relations. The YPG is one of them. Another problem is the extradition of an Islamic cleric. His name is Fethullah Bülent. There was an attempted coup in Turkey in 2016 as a marginal group within the Turkish military orchestrated an unsuccessful coup. And Turkey immediately accused this Islamic clerk who has been living in Pennsylvania since 1999. And right after... Was there any evidence that that was the case?
00:23:38 SPEAKER_04
there any evidence that that was the case? Sorry? Was there any evidence that that was the case, that Turkey was correct and that he had a hand in it?
00:23:45 SPEAKER_00
Well, it's very difficult because we know very little. Obviously, there is not publicly available information. But I believe that, yes, he has followers within Turkish military and I think they played an important role in orchestrating the coup. But I don't think they were the only actors. They were also officers who have been very... concerned about what Erdogan is doing to the country. And they are more secular and Western oriented. Which is the tradition of Turkey to be secular, right? Yes, exactly.
00:24:20 SPEAKER_04
Which is the tradition of Turkey to be secular, right? Yes, exactly. So there's been this evolution that I've read in the last 5 -10 years that Erdogan has taken over more control.
00:24:29 SPEAKER_00
Yes, that's right.
00:24:29 SPEAKER_04
right. It concerns a lot of Turkish members.
00:24:32 SPEAKER_00
Yes, that's right. And so Turkey requested this extradition. And the US response was that you have to provide hard evidence linking him directly to the coup attempt. And Turkey has failed to provide that evidence. And now the decisions are up to the courts. So that's why Turkey is not quite happy with the US. That's another issue that is held in bilateral relations. And of course Turkey's relationship with Russia and the S -400 deal. and some other incidents that took place in 2016, Turkey arrested local employees of a US mission in Turkey and other American citizens. So those are all the issues that have become very problematic. And with the European Union too, there are several other issues. So to sum up, Turkey in its foreign policy has become very marginalized and isolated.
00:25:31 SPEAKER_04
We'll be right back after a word from our sponsor. OneCA is under the umbrella of the Civil Affairs Association, a 501c19 veterans organization. People can support the podcast through tax -deductible donations. Money raised will be used to send junior NCOs and officers to two events hosted by the CA Association. The first is a symposium held each fall. The second is a roundtable and workshop held in the spring. Each junior NCO and officer selected will also receive a membership to the CA Association. If you'd like to support the podcast, then please visit the CA Association website at civilaffairsasoc .org. That's civilaffairsasoc .org. And please remember that all donations are tax deductible. Thanks for your support.
00:26:35 SPEAKER_04
Hi, welcome back to the 1CA podcast. Gunal, could you talk about, we mentioned briefly there, the secular history of Turkey. It's been a crossroads, an ancient crossroads for land -based trade, a mix of people from different regions coming through there. What has happened to that secular foundation? How has it shifted over the last several years? And what do you think is the future for secular society in Turkey?
00:27:01 SPEAKER_00
Let me refer to a recent public opinion poll conducted in Turkey by a center for, by a think tank here in DC, called Center for American Progress. So according to, I'm not 100 % about the numbers, I'm not 100 % sure about the numbers, but I think around 80 % of Turkey's population now think that Being Muslim is the main marker of their identity. So that's a major transformation because Turkey, although secularism has been a top -down project, so we had the founding fathers and it was the founding fathers' vision to establish a secular society. That vision was not very much in touch with the people because the people have always been very conservative, very religious, pious. But I think the Kemalist project, Mustafa Kemal was the name of the founding father. So the Kemalist project was to transform Turkey from an Islamic, conservative, Middle East oriented society to a Western, modern, secular society. And I think that project had its own problems because it alienated... It alienated the pious people, it alienated different ethnicities like the Kurds. So the ruling party is the result of that alienation because they came to power saying that this is a country that is largely conservative and we represent the people. So they presented themselves as a bottom -up. And that's why they have been very successful. And over the years since they came to power, they managed to transform society. And that's why today we have those poll results that people identify themselves with their Muslim identity. That's a significant transformation. And I think... And your family's there.
00:29:02 SPEAKER_04
your family's there. So you were born there and your family's still there. Outside of the polling results, have you seen that as well as your family talked about the shift?
00:29:11 SPEAKER_00
I have. I'm from a family. My mom covers her head and she's a religious person but she's always voted for the secular parties and she is a big fan of the founding father. So her religiosity is more cultural and so it's not... it's not a type of political Islam in a way, because she thinks that politics is corrupt and you shouldn't really, religion should not be part of politics. But now they talk about, they see more people covering their heads, they see more people talking about Islam as the main marker of their identity. But I think this is also different. This is a different type of religiosity because now we have a large middle class. So the religiosity of the 1980s, 1990s, it was different. So those were the marginalized people who had been oppressed by the Kemalist secular system. Now they're driving fancy cars and women who are wearing the hijab, the headscarf, they go to France for fashion shows. So it's become a fusion of that consumerism and religiosity. So in terms of lifestyle, a woman like myself and a woman who is wearing a headscarf, in terms of lifestyle and the taste, they have become similar.
00:30:49 SPEAKER_04
Very different from Saudi Arabia, for example, which is much more conservative and now has recently...
00:30:52 SPEAKER_00
which is much more conservative and now has
00:30:56 SPEAKER_04
allowed women to drive, and it's changed how they can dress in public. So it sounds like Turkey's evolved in the opposite direction, always had sort of this conservative roots, but has been now showing it publicly, and you say connected to the large middle class.
00:31:11 SPEAKER_00
Yes, exactly. So religiosity is on the rise globally, so not just in Turkey, but yeah, Turkey is not an exception.
00:31:21 SPEAKER_04
You mentioned earlier about the underbelly of Erdogan's government. Who are the main trading partners for Turkey and what are those big industries?
00:31:30 SPEAKER_00
The European Union. It's the biggest trading partner. Turkey and the European Union signed a customs union agreement in 1995. So they have become very close trading partners. But under President Erdogan, especially construction companies, they have become very active. And after Erdogan came to power, although the roots of that go back to the 1980s and 1990s, but it became more of an important factor under his rule. So he made trade as an important component of his foreign policy, especially his Middle East policy. So for instance, on his official visits to countries in the Middle East, there were hundreds of businessmen who would accompany him. Because he thought, and I don't know if you're familiar with the social science literature that says if you trade an economy, tie countries and societies together and it decreases the likelihood of conflict. So I think he followed that logic. So he built very close trade and investment ties with the countries in the region. For instance, there are hundreds of Turkish construction companies operating in northern Iraq. There are hundreds in Africa. So trade and investment have become an important component of his foreign policy strategy. But these days, especially with the European Union, there are many problems. So I think that affects... the trade dimension as well.
00:33:20 SPEAKER_04
So you talk about the construction, a lot of projects that are happening in neighboring countries in the Middle East. Does that mean that there's a large pool of skilled labor in Turkey? You know, the university system is pretty strong there. In the US, we talk a lot about STEM programs. Do those types of science, technology, engineering, math programs exist in Turkey as well?
00:33:42 SPEAKER_00
No. And I think Turkey was on its way to get there, but not anymore because the country has become... So Erdogan, he is engaged in a social engineering project.
00:33:56 SPEAKER_00
engaged in a social engineering project. So he wants to raise a pious generation. So he wants to create or recreate the society in his own image. And to be able to do that, education is the key. So that's why education has become very ideological. For instance, first graders are learning about the term jihad in schools. And that wasn't the case when I was a student in Turkey. Kemalism, secularism, so those were the core issues that we used to discuss in schools. And now the curriculum has become much more Islamic. And with that, of course, comes a decline in the quality of education in science and math. And recently, Erdogan promoted local science. And there is no such thing. The very meaning of science is, it's global, it's universal. If there is a fact, so if science is, the main aim of the science is finding out the facts, there are not many facts. There might be different interpretations, but there are not many facts. So you cannot make science local. But now that's his vision. So that's why I'm... Sad to say this, but in terms of science and technology and the quality of education, there's been a backslide in that.
00:35:36 SPEAKER_04
Gunal, I wanted to close by asking a question about the migration of people in the region and those people leaving Syria. You've studied and I think you've written about this in the past. How many Syrian migrants have been living in Turkey? How has Turkey responded to the influx of people living at its borders now?
00:35:58 SPEAKER_00
Well, there are around 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. That's a large, very large number. And of course, one of the reasons is that Turkey shares a long border with Syria. And the second reason is that Turkey pursued an open border policy after the Syrian conflict, to its credit. And I think the Syrian immigrants, their conditions are not great, but I think they are far better than many other Syrians living in different parts of the region. And recently, President Erdogan, for his own political calculations, but still I give credit to him for doing that, he has granted citizenship to 500 ,000 Syrian refugees. Of course, the expectation there is... that once they become citizens, they will vote for Erdoğan. But still, I think that's a major step in terms of improving the lives of those people. Because once you become a citizen, obviously, you benefit from the health and the education and everything else that the state is offering. The state has done a decent job in terms of accepting and trying to integrate them into the whole society. But like everywhere else, there is a nationalist backlash and societal tension is mounting. Especially in the border towns which host larger Syrian immigrant communities. We see the violence is increasing. There are an increasing number of attacks against the Syrian refugees. And the people, in public opinion surveys, they identify the Syrian refugees as the number one threat to the economy, to the security. And it's difficult to contain that. And I think that's why Erdogan is now talking about sending back those 3 million refugees back into Syria. And he talked about that in length, arguing that we are capturing territory in Syria so that we will create safe havens and so that these people can return their homes.
00:38:24 SPEAKER_04
Where would you recommend that members of the civil affairs community or anyone else listening to this episode should go for additional resources or updates about what's happening in Turkey?
00:38:35 SPEAKER_00
Well, Brookings Institute is a great think tank, and they have a very good Turkey program. Dr. Kemal Kirişçi, he's a very well -respected Turkish academic, and he is leading the program there, so I think he would be a great resource.
00:38:53 SPEAKER_04
Fantastic. Gönül Till from the Middle East Institute, thank you very much for your time.
00:38:57 SPEAKER_00
My pleasure, thank you.
00:39:22 SPEAKER_04
Thank you for spending some time with us. Please subscribe and come back for another installment of 1CA. Until then, be safe and secure the victory.
Tuesday May 01, 2018
Tuesday May 01, 2018
Welcome to the One CA Podcast.
Please welcome Roberto Carmack who received his PhD in Central Asian and Russian history. He is a Specialist at the 450th Civil Affairs Batallion (Airborne), U.S. Army Reserve. Roberto discusses Russian actions and the way ahead in the region.
Sponsored by the Civil Affairs Association. Produced and edited by John McElligott.
---
Transcript
00:00:29 SPEAKER_01
NATO members in Eastern Europe and even larger countries like Germany and France are very concerned with the potential for Russian aggression because the Russians did, in fact, slice off a piece of a sovereign country, Ukraine, and annex it.
00:01:06 SPEAKER_00
Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. My name is John McElligot. I'll be your host for this episode. We're joined today by a special guest from the 450th Civil Affairs Battalion Airborne. Roberto Carmack is a specialist, but he also has a PhD, so we'll call you Dr. Carmack for this episode if that's okay with you.
00:01:25 SPEAKER_01
That sounds good, sir.
00:01:26 SPEAKER_00
We wanted to talk with you today about your background and the connection between what you'd studied and what you're doing on the civilian side now. and how you think that may tie into civil affairs. So you're really a history buff. You earned a master's degree and a PhD in history. If you could, for everyone, describe your doctoral thesis and what your focus was.
00:01:46 SPEAKER_01
Sure. So I defended my thesis in 2015, and it's about Central Asia during World War II, and in particular about mobilization in Kazakhstan. Basically, what I've done is compare how Soviet authorities, In Russia and in Central Asia, mobilized all these different populations for the war effort, from Muslim Central Asians to Russians to people who were deported to the region during the war. So it's mainly designed to understand how mobilization worked in practice and how all these ethnic policies changed as a result of the war.
00:02:26 SPEAKER_00
To conduct your research, did you have to go to those countries?
00:02:29 SPEAKER_01
Yes, I did. I spent quite a bit of time in Kazakhstan, about a year. I mostly did archival work to locate these government documents that discuss these policies. I also did quite a lot of research in Moscow, something like three months.
00:02:48 SPEAKER_00
Was that speaking Russian and other languages?
00:02:51 SPEAKER_01
Right. So in Kazakhstan, you can get by. using Russian. I do speak Kazakh, but most of the documents for that period were written in Russian because there's a heavy bias towards the Russian language in all Soviet regions.
00:03:07 SPEAKER_00
So everyone else listening to this episode knows Specialist slash Dr. Carmack speaks multiple languages and is actually, you're getting paid by the Army for, what do you have now, Russian and Spanish on the record?
00:03:22 SPEAKER_01
That's right, yeah. Okay.
00:03:24 SPEAKER_00
Well, I would encourage everyone to go ahead and take those language exams and to learn another language. How has the process been for you in taking those exams and getting paid?
00:03:35 SPEAKER_01
You know, these exams are in some ways difficult and others not too bad. I came to Russian pretty late in life. I started studying the language in grad school, so I had to learn it basically from nothing. It took many years to get to a level where I can speak it and read it comfortably. and it requires frequent practice. Spanish was technically my first language, so I was able to reacquire it through review. But yeah, I mean, there are many, many soldiers that have language abilities that they learned in their households or through education. So like you, I definitely encourage them to seek the opportunity to take the exam because it's really great for your record, and the money certainly helps.
00:04:20 SPEAKER_00
Absolutely. Yeah, a little extra cash on top of the Battle Assembly pay is wonderful.
00:04:25 SPEAKER_01
Yeah.
00:04:26 SPEAKER_00
Dr. Carmack, I wanted to talk to you about the connection between the U .S. military and what's going on in Russia and to provide some background about the Russian Federation. So if we could try to break down the armed forces of the Russian Federation and how it compares to the U .S. It's my understanding that the service branches include ground forces. aerospace, Navy, strategic missile, airborne, and special operations forces. I'm not sure if they have anything related to civil affairs. And they have conscription, so citizens must join the military if they're age 18 to 27 for 12 months of service, which, based on my experience in the U .S. Army, that would take up a lot of your training anyway. And there was one estimate I found that mentioned approximately 5 .4 % of GDP spent in the military. Does that stack up against what you know, and how would you rank the strengths of the Russian military compared to those of the U .S.? Yeah,
00:05:26 SPEAKER_01
so that 5 .4 % of GDP going to military expenditures, that's actually quite high compared to most countries in Europe. You know, since 2008, the Russian government has initiated a pretty comprehensive program of military reform. Basically, their goal is to emphasize quality over quantity and modernize the military. So, you know, in general, from a technological and even strategic viewpoint, it doesn't seem that the Russians can match the United States or the NATO alliance in terms of sheer capacity. But thanks to these reforms, their military capacity has generally gone up.
00:06:15 SPEAKER_01
Your listeners probably know that Russia and Georgia, the former Soviet Republic, waged a short but pretty intense war. There were a lot of problems there, mainly because the different branches of the Russian military and even individual elements within the Russian army weren't coordinating their efforts. So there's a lot of miscommunications that definitely degraded their battlefield capacity. But now if we fast forward to recent events in Ukraine and Syria, it's very obvious. that the Russian ability to command and control their forces has improved dramatically. So are they a match for the United States and NATO? In the strictest sense, no. But it would be a mistake to underestimate them because they're improving their capacity practically every year. Okay.
00:07:01 SPEAKER_00
Well, you brought up a couple countries there as examples. You talked about Georgia, Syria, Ukraine. And I wanted to talk to you about the idea of a buffer zone. I've read about it very often, and I think it's a plausible argument. I read connected to geopolitics and the importance of geography. So do you agree that the Russian Federation needs a buffer, buffer zones? And what evidence do you have to support that idea?
00:07:28 SPEAKER_01
Absolutely. And that's not only something that I believe, but I think that the Russian government is definitely adhering to the military and geopolitical strategy. Really, the creation of these buffer zones is the only way to prevent offensive action against the Russian Federation, at least from the perspective of the Kremlin and the people making defense policy. The modern history of the Russian state is just filled with examples of foreign powers invading through vulnerable frontiers. The Nazi invasion during World War II is just a major example of that. It's not altogether surprising that Russian leaders are trying to keep their opponents like the United States and NATO away from their borders. For example, that was one of the major reasons why the Russians decided to intervene in Ukraine in the past few years. They need to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and that way, by keeping NATO forces out of Ukraine, they have more strategic flexibility to wage an effective defense should there be a war with the alliance.
00:08:35 SPEAKER_00
And what's the connection with Georgia and the Caucasus region?
00:08:40 SPEAKER_01
Yeah, Russian military and diplomatic strategy there is largely similar to what's going on in Ukraine. I referenced the 2008 war with Georgia before. You know, this narrow strip of territory between the Caspian and the Black Seas is of highest strategic importance for the Russians. Not only is it a... oil transfer point. But many of these countries in the past, like Georgia, have tried or at least flirted with the notion of joining NATO and establishing very close relations with the EU. The Russians are trying to prevent that by any means at their disposal through economic pressure and, if necessary, military pressure. So we can see the creation of a buffer zone there as a preeminent Russian concern. Okay.
00:09:30 SPEAKER_00
There's another area I wanted to bring up, and I haven't heard about it since Russia took over the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. What has happened since then?
00:09:40 SPEAKER_01
Yeah, so I think one of the reasons you haven't heard much out of Crimea is because the annexation has become normalized in a sense. Western media outlets have grown accustomed to it, and they see it as something that's an established fact. Although there's not a lot of armed conflict in the region like there is in those two separatist provinces in eastern Ukraine of Donetsk and Luhansk, there's still plenty going on. On the whole, Russian control on the peninsula is quite stable. The Russians have militarily fortified the peninsula, so any sort of armed incursion from the Ukrainian side is not really feasible. The Russians have accused the Ukrainian government of sending in these small special operations type teams to conduct sabotage operations and collect intel. But for the most part, the peninsula is militarily secure. So inside, the Russians are slowly working to consolidate their control over the governing apparatus and even the population. According to several independent polls, mostly conducted by Western research outfits, the majority of Crimeans, something like 80 percent, support Russian control over the Crimean peninsula. And this largely breaks down along ethnic lines. And it's not too surprising that most ethnic Russians there support Russia as opposed to Ukraine. strongly opposed to Russian control. One of them, and perhaps the most important, is the Crimean Tatars. They're a Turkic Muslim group that's native to the peninsula. And the Russians have been treating them extremely poorly by arresting their leaders, shutting down their representative institutions, and silencing their press. So there's a lot of potential there for future conflicts. So we'll have to see what happens within the next few years.
00:11:40 SPEAKER_00
Yeah, absolutely. And you brought up... Ethnic Russians. I've read that ethnic Russians are in decline, and that may be one reason why Russia is trying to expand again to include non -ethnic Russians within the Federation. What's the history, and where do you think we're headed?
00:12:00 SPEAKER_01
Yeah, it's a good point. I mean, there's no question that Russia is facing a demographic crisis. You know, the birth rate is extremely low. for a European country. And really, within the next few decades, it's not going to be likely that they'll be even able to support their military force at current levels. It's something that the leadership is well aware of and is worried about. Hence, they're instituting these pro -birth policies in an attempt to kind of boost the birth rate. And part of the consequence of this is that we have to remember, you know, The technical name for the country is the Russian Federation because it's a federation of many ethnic groups led by the Russians, including many groups that are non -Slavic and even Muslim. I'm talking about groups like the Chechens and the Tatars, and there are many others. These Muslim national or ethnic groups tend to have a higher birth rate than the native Russian population. So what we're going to see in the next 50 years or so is that these Muslim groups are going to gradually outstrip the Russian population. And it's obviously going to have a tremendous impact on Russian national identity and even their military policies.
00:13:18 SPEAKER_00
Have you seen pushback recently? Are ethnic Russians pushing back against non -ethnic Russians, or are they more inclusive?
00:13:29 SPEAKER_01
Well, on the one hand, no. When we're talking about groups like the Tatars, Russians consider them to be citizens of the Russian Federation and not too different from them. Most sattars speak Russian. They're aware of Russian cultural values, et cetera, et cetera. Where the pushback is coming in is with migrants from Central Asia. We're talking about ex -Soviet countries that aren't part of the Russian Federation anymore, countries like Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan. These countries sent huge numbers of labor migrants to work in places like Moscow and St. Petersburg. And yes, there's tremendous pushback against these populations. This has been going on for more than 10 years. There's been a huge upswing in racist sentiment that breaks down along racial lines and anti -immigrant sentiment. And you're right, as the Russian population experiences this demographic crisis, it seems likely that these kind of extremist sentiments... are going to increase.
00:14:31 SPEAKER_02
We'll be right back after a word from our sponsor.
00:14:54 SPEAKER_00
Each junior NCO and officer selected will also receive a membership to the CA Association. If you'd like to support the podcast, then please visit the CA Association website at civilaffairsassoc .org. That's civilaffairsassoc .org. And please remember that all donations are tax deductible. Thanks for your support.
00:15:35 SPEAKER_03
Welcome back to the 1CA podcast.
00:15:38 SPEAKER_00
I want to ask you about, as the Russian bear flexes its muscles in Eastern Europe, how much flexibility, how much give do you think there is within NATO circles and those Eastern European countries? And where do you think, if we call it a red line or... Where do you think Europe would feel Russia is going too far if they started to annex more territories like Latvia, for example? What's your take on that?
00:16:06 SPEAKER_01
your take on that? Yeah, so if we're talking about the Russian sphere of influence or their perceived sphere of influence, I think we can divide these countries into three broad categories. The first includes one of the countries that you mentioned. Latvia, and also Estonia, Lithuania, the Baltic countries. Here, the United States and NATO needs to draw a very firm and unambiguous red line because, you know, these are members of the NATO alliance. So if the Russians were to outrightly annex these countries or even subvert them by fanning ethnic conflict, that would really undermine the foundation of the NATO alliance. designed to repel Russian aggression, after all. So there can be no ambiguity that we will respond very aggressively to aggression in that sphere. But when we're talking about other countries, there's a second category. And here I have in mind countries like Ukraine and Georgia that, of course, are important to U .S. and even European interests, but our ability to shape events in these countries is rather limited. Here, I think we should push back whenever it's feasible, but probably not at the expense of sparking a wider military or diplomatic confrontation. And finally, there are certain countries where Russian influence is really predominant. Here I'm talking about Armenia. The Armenians are in some ways completely beholden to Moscow, Tajikistan, and Central Asia along the Afghan border, where the Russians have a great deal of military and even economic influence. Or a country like Belarus, Russia's strongest ally in Europe, and a country that's quite dictatorial like Russia itself. Here, the United States doesn't have much to offer these countries because its economic and diplomatic power is very far away. These governments aren't used to dealing with the United States. And here, we might have to refrain from pushing back in any substantial way because it just wouldn't be a good use of our limited resources.
00:18:20 SPEAKER_00
I think in the last few years, the United States has returned to pre -positioning assets and returning some equipment that was taken out of Europe. Is that what you've been tracking the last few years? Do you think that we are now increasing our footprint permanently or through exercises in Europe to push back against Russia?
00:18:40 SPEAKER_01
After 1991, the United States certainly started withdrawing substantial military forces from Europe. The view was that Russia was not weak and didn't pose a substantial geopolitical threat. But this has begun to change. It really started to change in 2008 when Vladimir Putin initiated a foreign policy that was quite aggressive, at least compared to Russian policy in the past. The situation changed radically in 2014. Now, all of these small NATO members in Eastern Europe and even larger countries like Germany and France are very concerned with the potential for Russian aggression because the Russians did, in fact, slice off a piece of a sovereign country, Ukraine, and annex it. This is almost unprecedented in Europe in the sense, you know, since World War II, that is.
00:19:26 SPEAKER_00
know, since
00:19:29 SPEAKER_01
So now there's been a lot of pressure for the United States to redeploy forces into Eastern Europe in order to create a ready force that could deter Russian aggression and, if necessary, repulse it. So, yeah, the United States has been more or less serious about reinforcing NATO's eastern border. Now there's a battalion -sized element in Estonia, Lapia, Lithuania, and Poland that's manned partially by the United States. The United States is also prepositioning heavy equipment to have it ready in case of a conflict. So in the future, it's very likely that these countries are going to continue requesting U .S. support and the reinforcement of U .S. forces, and that the United States is going to go along with it in order to send a clear message to the Russians that we're ready, that Eastern Europe is not a place where you can meddle with impunity. Right.
00:20:26 SPEAKER_00
And civil affairs units, active duty are certainly there, but also reserve units rotate through the exercises as a part of supporting the special and conventional forces in there. Roberto, I wanted to ask you about influence operations. So the United States saw that big time in the 2016 U .S. presidential election. So we've learned, most Americans learned how extensive the influence operations have become. Could you describe? how Russia has been meddling in European elections in recent years, and what other countries are doing to combat those efforts.
00:21:01 SPEAKER_01
Right. So as you intimated in your question, Russian meddling in the U .S. election is really just the tip of the iceberg. Within the past two years or so, the Russians have interfered with elections across Europe, from the United Kingdom to Germany and others. The goal here is to try to support candidates that are perceived to be sympathetic towards Russian interests and also to support groups that are on the political fringes of society in an effort to destabilize these political systems and, in mind, democratic values in these countries. And, you know, these efforts are wide ranging. And even countries as far away as Mexico and others in the Western Hemisphere have complained that the Russian government is meddling in their electoral processes. So this is really part and parcel of a comprehensive Russian cyber strategy to shape the international environment to suit Russian interests. And the election meddling is just one component of that.
00:22:05 SPEAKER_00
Okay.
00:22:06 SPEAKER_01
So, yes. NATO and the United States have obviously begun to recognize the danger that these kind of intrusive cyber efforts pose. About a month ago, NATO finally established a brand new cyber command, and the goal here is to better coordinate the Alliance's defensive and offensive capabilities in the cybersphere. So in the near future, we're probably going to see a situation where cyber warfare becomes a very important and in many senses the primary proxy. for geopolitical conflict between the United States and Russia, and between Russia and our European allies. So there's going to be something of an arms race that develops, I predict, between Russia and the West to develop cyber weapons, to develop countermeasures, and to outlink each other in the cybersphere. So most likely these kind of efforts to undermine our electoral process, to influence our electoral process, they're going to continue because the Russians see this as a cheap way. and relatively harmless from their perspective way of influencing us to their benefit.
00:23:15 SPEAKER_00
Well, you know, our job for the Army is civil affairs, military government. How do you think this folds into the work that we do for Army Reserve and civil affairs? Or how do you think the active duty forces in civil affairs, you know, what can you actually make it broader than that? So Army or Marine Corps? How do you think we should fold in what's happening in cyber with civil affairs?
00:23:41 SPEAKER_01
That's a good question. You know, civil affairs is a branch of the Army that doesn't really have a clear cyber function offensively or defensively.
00:23:49 SPEAKER_00
really have
00:23:52 SPEAKER_01
or defensively. Obviously, we're impacted by it. You know, cyber attacks against the military will obviously degrade civil affairs operations. But really, one thing we can do... is to try to ensure that, for example, civilian areas in contested zones like Ukraine and the Baltic states have a cyber capability. What that means in practice, they need computers, they need internet access, they need networks, and that's something civil affairs can plug into, and it's something that we can help ensure the survival of on the cheap. It's something that doesn't have a clear military component. but we need to make sure that these countries have the potential to develop the weapons to fight in the cybersphere.
00:24:42 SPEAKER_00
Yeah, I would think it would be helpful for ensuring that if people are getting messages through the Internet and if they have a connection to the Internet, they would see messages from U .S. or Allied forces regarding movements or to avoid tripping up any maneuver commanders' operations. essentially stay out of our way or to then find out what the impact of operations is on the local population through the internet, through chat rooms, through message boards, or through news stories that are posted online.
00:25:15 SPEAKER_01
Absolutely. And we have to keep in mind that some of these Eastern European countries are highly plugged in. Estonia is a good example. Many, many of their government functions depend almost completely on the internet. About 10 years ago, Moscow orchestrated a pretty comprehensive attack on Estonia's cyber infrastructure. It was devastating. It only lasted a few days, but the Russians showed that if they wanted to, they could absolutely cripple that country.
00:25:35 SPEAKER_00
was devastating.
00:25:42 SPEAKER_01
that country. So I think the U .S. would need to fortify these networks to... resist that because it could be so devastating for the countries involved. And it would have all sorts of civil affairs implications as critical government infrastructure, things like hospitals shut down.
00:26:06 SPEAKER_00
Yeah, you're absolutely right. Roberto, I wanted to ask you about what brought you over to civil affairs. So why join the Army and then why join the civil affairs branch?
00:26:16 SPEAKER_01
Well, I joined the Army because I'm obviously interested in military history. I wanted to get out of the library. I wanted to do something a little bit more hands -on, and I figured the Army was the most logical place to do that and also contribute to my country as best as I could. Civil affairs was a more or less natural choice for me because it's one of the professions in the Army where People put a premium on knowing about the cultures of foreign peoples and how to interact with them. That's key to civil affairs operations. And since I'm naturally inclined to study foreign cultures and foreign peoples, it seemed like a very logical choice for me.
00:27:05 SPEAKER_00
Well, we value you being a part of the unit. We think that you're a fantastic addition to civil affairs and clearly know a lot about what's happening in the region with the Russian Federation and its neighbors. And I wanted to ask you to close this episode by asking you about some references, where you would recommend other members of the civil affairs community or United Action Partners. Where should they go for information about what's happening within the Russian Federation in the region?
00:27:36 SPEAKER_01
One of the best websites that reports on the broader Eurasian region with an emphasis on the former Soviet Union is Eurasianet .org. They have good reporting that's hard to find in other more mainstream outlets. New York Times, when they do report on Russia, it tends to be of pretty high quality. They have good reporters that are well -versed in Russian politics and current affairs. For the Russian speakers, there's Kommersant .ru. Kommersant is a pretty good independent Russian newspaper that doesn't adhere to the government line, which is hard to find in Russia today. Those are the main sources that I use to stay abreast of these contemporary issues.
00:28:23 SPEAKER_00
Thank you very much. Well, Roberto Carmack, thank you very much for joining us in the 1CA podcast.
00:28:28 SPEAKER_01
My pleasure, sir. Thank you.
00:28:33 SPEAKER_00
Thank you for spending some time with us. Please subscribe and come back for another installment of 1CA. Until then, be safe and secure the victory.
Tuesday May 01, 2018
Tuesday May 01, 2018
Welcome to the One CA Podcast.
Please welcome Sean Acosta, Sergeant First Class and Instructor at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). He discusses lessons learned from deployments and how his current role at the CA "schoolhouse" is helping to create the next generation of CA Soldiers.
Sponsored by the Civil Affairs Association. Hosted and edited by John McElligott.
---
Transcript
00:01:26 SPEAKER_03
U .S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Sergeant Acosta, thank you very much. Thanks for joining us.
00:01:36 SPEAKER_04
Yeah, thanks for having me.
00:01:37 SPEAKER_03
Sean, I want to talk about your background and why you got interested in civil affairs. So you enlisted in the Army as a combat medic in 2006. You went through basic at Fort Benning, AIT or advanced individual training at Fort Sam Houston in Texas, and then you worked for the Army 2007 to 2010. including a deployment to Afghanistan, also to Haiti. Those were in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and then Operation Unified Response in Haiti. Tell us about your experiences in Afghanistan and Haiti. How did you leverage your experience as a combat medic? Also let us know, was there any connection to civil affairs at that point?
00:04:07 SPEAKER_03
You mentioned SOCUM. Can you explain for people what SOCUM means and how that's different from being a combat medic in a line unit for the Army?
00:05:49 SPEAKER_03
So it was a...
00:05:54 SPEAKER_04
was a...
00:06:15 SPEAKER_03
assistance disaster response. When you talk to those guys, apparently they were very successful in helping to recruit you over. You mentioned you wanted to look for something different. Was it the interaction with different Army units? Was it interaction with locals? What were the things that really spoke to you and wanted to drop that packet to apply for civil affairs?
00:07:42 SPEAKER_03
You dropped that packet to apply for civil affairs and go to the civil affairs qualification course or CAQC. Tell us about that process. How long did it take? Did you get recycled at any point, having to go through any piece of that? How difficult do you think it was for you and the other folks who were trying to go through at the same time?
00:09:53 SPEAKER_04
However,
00:11:18 SPEAKER_03
And so for that, was that pipeline about a year, year and a half?
00:11:23 SPEAKER_04
Typically it's about a year. The officers now have their own career course, Caps Career Course Act, or RSOC, Caps Career Course. So for the officers, it's probably about a year and a half. Enlisted, it's about a year.
00:11:38 SPEAKER_04
a year.
00:11:39 SPEAKER_03
Interesting to hear that HRC chooses the language for you. Did you have a language background already?
00:12:21 SPEAKER_04
to keep up on your own on a team. We do get an opportunity to do a refresher once a year, like a 30 -day refresher. So currently my DAR is a 1 +, 1+. I've been able to keep it at that level. I've actually dropped a little bit. I was at a 2 -2. But I'd say active duty side, being able to maintain your language is pretty difficult with operational tempo.
00:12:40 SPEAKER_03
Yeah, it's tough. If you have a background language, then you can carry that forward on the reserve side. I just happen to speak some French and a little bit in another language the Army doesn't really care about. But, you know, it's, yeah, it's the same thing. You just have to carve out time in the evenings or weekends. But once you qualify at any minimum language, even if you take a test and you score 0 -0, it shows that you're interested in learning the language. And you can get, I think, some funding through the Total Army Language Program and become trained in whatever that is. And so if you're a 38 series, 38 Bravo, 38 Alpha, they'll put some more money into sending you to learn that language, which may or may not be aligned with your unit and, you know, it's regionally aligned. So my unit is aligned with Central Command. It's in the Army's interest to send me to learn Persian Dari or Arabic or something else. But since I already speak some French, they could send me to speak and learn more French. Sean, I wanted to ask you about after going through the CAQC, you were then assigned to Alpha Company 81st CA Battalion, which is, was that under, can you tell us about the task organization on the active duty side and what was, I think, the 85th Brigade, now has been downsized, and the 95th Brigade. How are they organized now with battalions?
00:14:12 SPEAKER_04
Yeah, so they can talk about that.
00:14:49 SPEAKER_04
not just off. So the 85th stood up. In 185th, you had the 81st, which was South Com aligned. At Fort Hood, you had the 80th, which was at Fort Bliss, and that supported UConn. The 84th was at Fort Lewis,
00:15:08 SPEAKER_04
at Fort Lewis, supported. You had the 80th track, which is actually the only remaining battalion from that brigade that's still up. And they originally supported CENTCOM, although now that the brigade has the headquarters to shut down, they...
00:15:38 SPEAKER_03
CA Battalion, and then at some point you were tagged to go support Enduring Freedom, and then you served as the CA NCO, going on in support of operations that were in, how do you pronounce the district? Panjwaii? Yes,
00:15:59 SPEAKER_03
Panjwaii. Panjwaii District, okay. Kandahar Province. Okay. For what you're allowed to share, can you talk to us about What you did as a CA and CO on that team?
00:16:13 SPEAKER_04
Yeah, so we supported 4th Brigade, a 2nd Infantry Division. They were the battlespace partners that specifically supported a 3 -8. Alpha Company itself deployed and aligned under 4th Brigade. Each cast supported a different battlespace on our different battalion. My team was in Penguin District and we supported 1 -3 -8.
00:17:18 SPEAKER_03
I'm happy you're going to grade yourself and your team. How did you guys do?
00:17:23 SPEAKER_04
So, luckily, I had a very smart team leader, Captain John Ciesco at the time, now Major John Ciesco.
00:17:59 SPEAKER_03
That's wonderful. Well, thanks for going there. Sean, after you got back, you were reassigned. You went to HHC for the 85th CA Battalion, serving as an assistant operations sergeant in the S3 shop. How was that like, going from a CA NCO to working in the S3 shop?
00:18:19 SPEAKER_04
So, I'll just be completely honest, I think it's every NCO's worst nightmare to go to the staff position.
00:19:46 SPEAKER_03
It's really important for people to get that experience. I totally agree.
00:19:50 SPEAKER_02
We'll be right back after a word from our sponsor. OneCA is under the umbrella of the Civil Affairs Association, a 501C19 veterans organization. People can support the podcast through tax -deductible donations. Money raised will be used to send junior NCOs and officers to two events hosted by the CA Association. The first is a symposium held each fall. The second is a roundtable and workshop held in the spring. Each junior NCO and officer selected will also receive a membership to the CA Association. If you'd like to support the podcast, then please visit the CA Association website at civilaffairsasoc .org. That's civilaffairsasoc .org. And please remember that all donations are tax deductible. Thanks for your support.
00:20:54 SPEAKER_02
Hi, and welcome back to the 1CA podcast.
00:20:57 SPEAKER_03
So then from there, Sean, you went to the 83rd CA Battalion, and that you got your chance to be a team sergeant in Delta Company. This was supporting the 82nd Airborne Division's Global Response Force. And with a part of that, actually, you went over from Delta Company to Bravo Company and deployed to Cameroon. This was in support of Operation Juniper Shield. What was it like going over to support the 82nd? And let's go from that into a discussion about Cameroon.
00:21:27 SPEAKER_04
The 15 months that I spent supporting the GRF mission, 82nd's GRF mission, I think initially everyone kind of, I wouldn't say they're depressed, but everybody wants to kind of get out the door. Everyone is always looking for the next mission. When am I deploying again? In GRF, it's like unless something really bad happens, I'm going to be sitting here going.
00:23:15 SPEAKER_03
That's good to hear. And so you prepared these folks for the opportunity, if the balloon went up, to respond. And then there was a deployment that came up in Cameroon. So was that something you may have sought out? Or that somebody tapped you on the shoulder and said, hey, you know, you want this chance? Go to Cameroon to support Juniper Shield.
00:24:24 SPEAKER_03
So your experience in deployments before had been Afghanistan, Haiti, and then Cameroon. Quite different. How did the mission differ from where you had been before and what you had been training for? When you hit the ground in Cameroon, was it completely different from the plan that you had before you arrived?
00:28:56 SPEAKER_04
It's like the German USAID.
00:29:02 SPEAKER_00
like the German USAID.
00:29:05 SPEAKER_04
Yes, exactly. They're equivalent to the German USAID. Working with those organizations, we would kind of approach it from that angle and try to attack that critical capability and that vulnerability, utilizing our assistance.
00:29:21 SPEAKER_03
Yeah, it's a tough nut to correction on. I think when I was a Peace Corps volunteer in Cote d 'Ivoire, West Africa, and then transferred to Madagascar, Especially in West Africa, in Cote d 'Ivoire and some other countries nearby, you get the same issues that you saw in Cameroon. And sometimes for the students, it was in their interest not to have those IDs so they could forge them or update them and stay in school or play on a soccer team or get access to services that they otherwise would have aged out of. But you're right, that's the next wave of the violent extremist groups, organizations. Hitting West Africa and the sub -Saharan whole region. Yeah, we're seeing that in the news reports coming out pretty often now. Well, you mentioned something there about your experience in Cameroon, building on what you learned previously and leading up to the role you have now, which is as a civil affairs instructor at the Special Warfare Center School, or what we call SWCC. Tell us about what you're doing as an instructor. Is this as a part of the CAQC? some other course that's happening.
00:30:32 SPEAKER_04
So I've been at 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group at SWCC for only about 60 days now. However, I've kind of been in and out, I'd say over the past four months, kind of getting to know how things run there. But I'm currently assigned to Bravo Company, which is the company that runs the Civil Affairs Qualification course or the MOS space.
00:31:13 SPEAKER_04
the core task, moving more towards core competencies in the new doctrinal terms that they're using in the draft, 3 -57. Teaching them basic negotiation skills, mediation skills, how to conduct civil engagements, how to go through that BCA methodology and that operational design to identify where those vulnerabilities, the civil vulnerabilities are within a society and what's causing these cycles of violence, if you will.
00:32:09 SPEAKER_03
Is it the challenge that you thought it would be?
00:33:24 SPEAKER_03
Sean, what are some tips that you would have for the enlisted guys going through your course? For example, when I was going through the schoolhouse, they really did a foot stomp. You need to read the stuff we tell you to read. You need to come to class prepared. Of course, maintain yourself physically, be in shape so that you can handle whatever we throw at you in the field. But if you come unprepared, you're not going to have a... good conversation with the fellow students. Instructors will pick up on that. They'll know, and you'll be behind. But is it reading stuff? Is it the competencies you're talking about, the transition from core tasks to competencies? Are people repeatedly failing at one of those or not knowing negotiation skills? What are some failure points and tips for people?
00:34:19 SPEAKER_04
So I'll say in most other Army schools you can go to, Just being able to memorize things that are given to you during a class will get you by the test, right?
00:34:31 SPEAKER_04
So the instructor tells you one thing, I memorized this definition or whatever verbatim, and good to go. It's not the case here. Like I was saying, initially, civil affairs requires capacity. We need critical thinkers. We need people that are adaptable.
00:34:54 SPEAKER_04
the why behind why are we doing this why is this important and then how to
00:37:06 SPEAKER_03
Yeah, I agree with you. I saw the same thing. Don't be weird.
00:37:07 SPEAKER_04
with you. I saw the same thing.
00:37:10 SPEAKER_04
Yeah, don't be weird.
00:37:12 SPEAKER_03
was active duty or reserve at the end of the course, you could have, in retrospect, tried to predict the people you can't just have a normal conversation with and think, wow, okay, maybe there were some signs early on you could have picked up on, yeah, they were going to have some trouble in this area. But you really don't know until the end. There were also some people I thought weren't going to make it who did, made it through physically and made it through the aspects of being challenged like that. You don't know until you're actually put under the stress how you're going to react. It's tough to predict that with some people.
00:38:43 SPEAKER_03
Yeah. Sean, I want to close this up by asking about a resource that you go to for current events or a book you're reading now, something that you're doing outside of your day job to help to connect you with the larger world, which may or may not inform what you're doing for civil affairs. But if it does, great. Share with us something you're reading or a resource that you go to that others may find helpful for them as well. Yeah. There's both online, thesis written about it, as well as different books you can explore.
00:40:18 SPEAKER_04
coming back to you.
00:40:22 SPEAKER_03
Sergeant Sean Acosta, thank you very much for being here. Thanks for being on the 1CA podcast.
00:40:26 SPEAKER_04
Thanks for having me. I appreciate it.
00:40:45 SPEAKER_02
Thank you for spending some time with us. Please subscribe and come back for another installment of one CA. Until then, be safe and secure the victory.