5: Gonul Tol, Middle East Institute, on Turkey

Welcome to the Once CA Podcast.

Please welcome Gonul Tol, the founding director of the Middle East Institute's Center for Turkish Studies, who discusses Turkey and Turkish relations in the region.

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Transcript

00:01:29    SPEAKER_00
What Turkey is trying to do in Syria today is curbing the influence of the Syrian Kurds and that has become in fact the backbone of not only Turkey's Syria strategy but Turkey's regional strategy.

00:02:06    SPEAKER_04
This is John McElligot, your host for this episode of the 1CA podcast. We're joined today by Gunal Tol. She's the founding director of the Middle East Institute's Center for Turkish Studies. She's also an adjunct professor at George Washington University's Institute for Middle East Studies. After three years of field research in Germany and the Netherlands, she wrote her dissertation on the radicalization of the Turkish Islamist movement Miliskurus in Western Europe. She was also an adjunct professor at the College of International Security Studies at the National Defense University. She has taught courses on Islamist movements in Western Europe, Turkey, world politics, and the Middle East. She has written extensively on Turkey -U .S. relations, Turkish domestic politics, and foreign policy in the Kurdish issue. She's also a frequent media contributor. Ma 'am, thank you very much for being here.

00:02:58    SPEAKER_00
Thanks for having me.

00:02:59    SPEAKER_04
We wanted to talk about what you're focusing on these days. What are you writing about?

00:03:04    SPEAKER_00
Well, mostly about Turkey and what Turkey is doing in Syria. Recently, Turkey launched a military incursion into the northwestern Kurdish enclave. It's called Afrin. And it's a major concern, especially for the U .S. and the U .S. military, because the U .S. is there working with the Syrian Kurdish militia, and that's called the YPG, and Turkey at the moment is attacking the YPG forces in Afrin. And recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to move into Manbij. Manbij is another northern Syrian town that is under the control of U .S.-backed Kurdish forces. And there are also around 2 ,000 U .S. Special Operations Forces in Manbij. So if Erdogan delivers on his threat and moves into Manbij, that could potentially... There is a high risk of a clash between the US and Turkey, so that's what we mostly focus on these days.

00:04:09    SPEAKER_04
Why do you think the average American should care about what's happening in Turkey right now?

00:04:13    SPEAKER_00
I think mainly because what the United States is trying to do in Syria is it's trying to confront the radical Islamic State in Syria. And it's working with the Kurdish militia there. And what Turkey is doing in Syria, the Syria policy that Turkey pursues,

00:04:32    SPEAKER_01
is doing in Syria, the Syria policy that

00:04:37    SPEAKER_00
has a direct impact on what the U .S. is trying to do in Syria. So what Turkey is doing in Syria is important for the U .S. national security interest.

00:04:48    SPEAKER_04
I've read a lot about that the last couple of years. And the Syrian civil war has been going on now for quite a while. What do you think would be the turning point over the next six months or year, considering other players like Russia as well?

00:05:03    SPEAKER_00
Well, it's very difficult. In 2011, when the uprising started, many experts as well as intelligence organizations, they thought that Assad only had six months because he didn't have the backing of the majority of the population. He was only backed by the Alevi minority. So people thought that he could not survive longer than six months, and that hasn't really happened. So it's really difficult to predict what will happen next in Syria. But what I see is because of Russian involvement in Syria,

00:05:42    SPEAKER_00
of Russian involvement in Syria, as you know, Russia militarily involved in Syria in 2015. And since then, I think it turned the tide in the Syrian conflict. So the regime gained a lot of territory, captured territory from the Islamic State and from the opposition. So the regime at the moment, the Assad regime, is quite confident that it will control all the territory that it used to control before the Syrian conflict started. So I think at this point, I'm not... hopeful that the Syrian opposition can put up a real fight. So that means probably with Russian backing and the backing of Iran and the Shia militias there, the regime is going to win. Again, they now, they captured a lot of territory and through diplomatic means as well, not just through military means. They have European countries, I think the majority of the international community now resign themselves to the fact that Assad will not go. So he is here to stay. And the main priority of international actors is to contain the Islamic State. And that's why toppling the regime is not a priority anymore. So when you combine that with the fact... that the regime is gaining military on the ground, I think the picture gets clearer that the regime will not be toppled. And also we have to talk about the state of the Syrian opposition. They were in a better place a few years ago now. Their international backers are not supporting them. They are not providing them logistical aid, financial aid anymore.

00:07:33    SPEAKER_01
financial aid

00:07:36    SPEAKER_00
They are very divided and the international community has their own suspicions because there are many radical groups inside the Free Syrian Army. So all these factors make it very difficult for the Syrian opposition to put up a real fight against the Assad regime. So that's why if I had to predict, I would say that the regime would probably win this war.

00:08:04    SPEAKER_04
It's connected to something you presented in 2015. You spoke at an MEI event and discussed Turkey's two objectives in Syria. The first was toppling Assad regime, which you've mentioned is unlikely now. And the second was preventing a Kurdish corridor along Turkey's southern border by marginalizing the Syrian Kurds. Could you talk about the background of the group Syria? Who are the Syrian Kurds and what's the connection to Turkey?

00:08:33    SPEAKER_00
Well, as you know, the Kurds are actually the biggest minority that do not have a state. There are around 30 million Kurds in the region, and they are spread across different countries, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. And they are a marginalized group because in the countries that they live in, they are suppressed. In Turkey, for instance, 20 % of the population is of Kurdish origin. And yet they are still struggling. In fact, they've been waging a war against the Turkish state since the 1980s.

00:08:40    SPEAKER_01
are around

00:09:05    SPEAKER_00
So they want more political, social, economic rights. The Kurds in Syria, they are at a better place because since the first Gulf War, thanks to the no -fly zone established by the United States and the international community, they have an autonomous region. What started as a de facto autonomous region became a real autonomous region after the second Gulf War. So they have their own military, they have their own parliament, they have their own resources. So they are the ones, the Iraqi Kurds are the ones who have come closest to becoming a state. And in fact... They held a referendum in September 2017, an independence referendum. Unfortunately, it failed because all international actors, including Turkey and the United States, were opposed to the referendum. So they have become very fragile. Their project for independence is quite fragile at the moment. And the Syrian Kurds, again, they are oppressed by the regime. And until the Syrian conflict started, they did not even have ID cards. So if you do not have an ID card, you can't benefit from the services that the state is offering. So they have been very marginalized as well. And in Iran too, there is a sizable Kurdish minority. And in all these countries, in Turkey for instance, there is an organization that is considered a terrorist organization by Turkey. the US and the European Union, that is called the PKK. And it has its sister organizations in Syria, in Iraq, and in Iran. Their headquarters are in Iraq. So Turkey has been waging a war against the PKK. And it considers the YPG. The YPG is the group that the United States is working with, cooperating. They have become... an important ally in the fight against the Islamic State. So the United States considers the PKK as a terrorist organization, but technically the YPG, which is the PKK's Syrian offshoot, is not considered a terrorist organization by the United States. So that loophole created a lot of tension between Turkey and the United States. And Turkey thinks that there is no difference between the YPG and the PKK. What do you think?

00:11:43    SPEAKER_04
do you think?

00:11:44    SPEAKER_00
Well, I think they are the exact same organization. They share the same ideology. It's a Marxist -Leninist ideology. And they have the same leadership. And in terms of micromanaging daily affairs. The YPG might have some autonomy from the PKK, but I think they are the exact same organization. So that's why Turkey has been quite concerned about the fact that after the Syrian conflict started, the YPG started establishing this autonomous region in northern Syria. So that's why... Turkey's number one priority in Syria has become not toppling the Assad regime, but confronting the YPG and curbing its influence in Syria. So why does Turkey even care about the YPG?

00:12:40    SPEAKER_04
why does Turkey even care about the YPG? Do they hold strategically significant land or could? Economic interests? Why couldn't Turkey just forget about it, leave them alone? It's a very good question.

00:12:52    SPEAKER_00
leave them alone? It's a very good question. And you know, in Washington, D .C., we... talk about all different other things, but we don't actually ask this question. So it's a very important question. I personally believe that the YPG does not pose a threat to Turkey. The PKK does, obviously. The PKK is a terrorist organization and has been waging a war against Turkey since 1980s, but not the YPG. But Turkey considers it as a national security threat because the YPG started So in 2011, and that was when the Syrian conflict started, at the time Turkey had very close ties to the Assad regime. President Erdogan was friends with President Assad. They even vacationed together and Turkey had invested heavily in Syria. Visa restrictions were lifted. The two countries held joint cabinet meetings. Turkey, there were many Turkish companies, construction companies operating in Syria and Syria became Turkey's gateway to the rest of the region. So Turkey had very close ties, cultivated close ties to Syria. So that's why when the Syrian conflict started, Turkey did not immediately join the anti -Assad camp, thinking that Erdogan had leverage over Assad and Erdogan thought that he could in fact force Assad to carry out reforms. But of course that did not happen. So after a few months, Turkey came to terms with the fact that Assad was not going to leave and joined the anti -Assad camp. And when that happened, and Turkey did not only join the anti -Assad camp, but it became an organizational hub for the Syrian opposition. So in retaliation, the Assad regime allowed all the PKK leadership. who have been living in exile in Europe to come back to the country and basically gave a free hand to establish an autonomous region in northern Syria. And that's when Turkey's threat perception was heightened. Turkey thought that Assad is going to allow the Kurds to establish a continuous autonomous region which might link... to the Iraqi Kurdish region, so the Kurds will have access to the Mediterranean. And that's a major threat for Turkey because they think that if there is a continuous Kurdish autonomous region that has access to the Mediterranean right there, right on my southern border, then maybe my own Kurdish community will want similar things. So that's why Turkey is... turned its attention to the Kurds in Syria. So initially Turkey's number one focus in Syria was toppling the regime. Now it's become a secondary and maybe it's not even on Turkey's agenda anymore. So what Turkey is trying to do in Syria today is curbing the influence of the Syrian Kurds and that has become in fact the backbone of not only Turkey's Syria strategy but Turkey's regional strategy. Turkey is trying to do that in Iraq with the Iraqi Kurds. And that has shaped Turkey's relations with Russia. That's the main reason for the Turkey -Russia rapprochement. That's the main reason for Turkey -Iran rapprochement. That's the main reason for the problematic relationship between Turkey and the US. So that fear of Kurdish separatism has become the backbone of Turkey's foreign policy.

00:16:39    SPEAKER_04
It's interesting you talk about the connection there with Russia as well, because I wanted to ask you the regional power plays. And I was reading Peter Zeihan's predictions for Turkey and focused on three areas. One was conquer or ally with Romania and Bulgaria. Two, secure oil from Kurdish Iraq or Azerbaijan. Three, show interest in possibly retaking the Crimean Peninsula to the effect of being recognized by Russia as a regional power in that lower Danube area. and securing national gas exports. So there's the southern border that Turkey is focusing on heavily. But what else do you see going on with its neighbors? And where else is drawing, what other areas are drawing Turkey's focus right now? Well,

00:17:27    SPEAKER_00
again, I think the fear of Kurdish separatism is number one on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. And that's driving its relations with Russia. with Iran, with Baghdad, with Syria, and it's even creating tensions with the Gulf countries, and Turkey had close ties with, especially with Saudi Arabia. So currently with Russia, I think Turkey was so frustrated with the United States that the US chose to work with the YPG that it turned to Russia in Syria, because it was obvious. For a long time, the expectation in Turkey was that it was the Obama administration decision. So a few folks within the Obama administration made that decision. But once Obama is out of the picture, President Trump would have a different policy and would have a more favorable policy. So that was the expectation in Turkey. But the opposite has happened. Trump, in fact, took a major step and decided that the Pentagon would directly arm the YPG. So that was a step that Obama was reluctant to take. So that's why Turkey's hopes were dashed. So after Turkey realized that Trump would not change US's close cooperation with the YPG, Turkey figured that it had to work with Russia, it had to work with Iran, and it had to work with the Syrian regime. Because the main thinking behind that strategy was that Assad does not want an autonomous Kurdish region. He wants to control the entire country. And Iran, it has its own Kurdish minority. So they are as well vulnerable to a Kurdish autonomy project. So they might work with Turkey. And Russia, if Turkey delivers on other issues. that Russia might be willing to curb the Kurdish influence in Syria. So that was the expectation. And that's why Turkey cultivated close ties with these countries, with Russia, Iran, and even with the regime. So now they have become Astana partners. So they established a mechanism in Astana. Russia is leading the diplomatic efforts there. It's trying to find a solution to the Syrian conflict. And Turkey has been signing deals to create de -escalation zones in Syria. So through those de -escalation zones, in fact, the Assad regime is gaining more territory. But Turkey is okay with that as long as all these countries, Russia, Iran and the Assad regime, turn a blind eye to what Turkey is doing in Syria against the Kurds. So that's why I'm saying that its fear of Kurdish separatism has become the number one driver of Turkey's relations with its neighbors. With Russia there are several other issues, important factors. Turkey is dependent on Russian energy. And also in 2015, you might remember this, Turkey downed a Russian jet because Russia violated Turkish. airspace and that became a turning point and it was a wake -up call for Turkey because right after that incident Russia deployed S -400 missiles in Syria and also imposed economic sanctions that hurt Turkish economy a lot and economy is President Erdoğan's soft belly and took other measures that really made Turkey quite vulnerable so Turkey realized that that it could not effort to alienate Russia. So, since then, Turkey has been trying to cultivate closer ties. For instance, Turkey is trying to purchase S -400 missiles from Russia, and that has pissed NATO off for obvious reasons. And many in Washington are talking about a strategic shift in Turkey's foreign policy direction. a shift away from the West and NATO to Russia. I don't think that is the case, but Turkey is working closely with Russia. With Iran, again, it's working closely in Syria with Iran, but I don't think that is a strategic shift either, because there are also issues that are dividing these countries. They are not on the same page on everything, and they are competing for influence in Iraq. in Syria, in the region in general. So there are limits to their cooperation. In Iraq, Turkey had very problematic relations with Baghdad, with the central government, for several reasons. For many years, Turkey had very close ties with the Iraqi Kurds and signed energy deals without the approval of Baghdad that angered Baghdad. The Baghdad officials thought that Turkey was meddling in internal affairs. Now, Turkey has tense relations with the Iraqi Kurds and trying to cultivate closer ties with Baghdad. But there are just too many suspicions in Baghdad towards Turkey. And with the European countries and the US, I talked about the problems in Turkey -US relations. The YPG is one of them. Another problem is the extradition of an Islamic cleric. His name is Fethullah Bülent. There was an attempted coup in Turkey in 2016 as a marginal group within the Turkish military orchestrated an unsuccessful coup. And Turkey immediately accused this Islamic clerk who has been living in Pennsylvania since 1999. And right after... Was there any evidence that that was the case?

00:23:38    SPEAKER_04
there any evidence that that was the case? Sorry? Was there any evidence that that was the case, that Turkey was correct and that he had a hand in it?

00:23:45    SPEAKER_00
Well, it's very difficult because we know very little. Obviously, there is not publicly available information. But I believe that, yes, he has followers within Turkish military and I think they played an important role in orchestrating the coup. But I don't think they were the only actors. They were also officers who have been very... concerned about what Erdogan is doing to the country. And they are more secular and Western oriented. Which is the tradition of Turkey to be secular, right? Yes, exactly.

00:24:20    SPEAKER_04
Which is the tradition of Turkey to be secular, right? Yes, exactly. So there's been this evolution that I've read in the last 5 -10 years that Erdogan has taken over more control.

00:24:29    SPEAKER_00
Yes, that's right.

00:24:29    SPEAKER_04
right. It concerns a lot of Turkish members.

00:24:32    SPEAKER_00
Yes, that's right. And so Turkey requested this extradition. And the US response was that you have to provide hard evidence linking him directly to the coup attempt. And Turkey has failed to provide that evidence. And now the decisions are up to the courts. So that's why Turkey is not quite happy with the US. That's another issue that is held in bilateral relations. And of course Turkey's relationship with Russia and the S -400 deal. and some other incidents that took place in 2016, Turkey arrested local employees of a US mission in Turkey and other American citizens. So those are all the issues that have become very problematic. And with the European Union too, there are several other issues. So to sum up, Turkey in its foreign policy has become very marginalized and isolated.

00:25:31    SPEAKER_04
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00:26:35    SPEAKER_04
Hi, welcome back to the 1CA podcast. Gunal, could you talk about, we mentioned briefly there, the secular history of Turkey. It's been a crossroads, an ancient crossroads for land -based trade, a mix of people from different regions coming through there. What has happened to that secular foundation? How has it shifted over the last several years? And what do you think is the future for secular society in Turkey?

00:27:01    SPEAKER_00
Let me refer to a recent public opinion poll conducted in Turkey by a center for, by a think tank here in DC, called Center for American Progress. So according to, I'm not 100 % about the numbers, I'm not 100 % sure about the numbers, but I think around 80 % of Turkey's population now think that Being Muslim is the main marker of their identity. So that's a major transformation because Turkey, although secularism has been a top -down project, so we had the founding fathers and it was the founding fathers' vision to establish a secular society. That vision was not very much in touch with the people because the people have always been very conservative, very religious, pious. But I think the Kemalist project, Mustafa Kemal was the name of the founding father. So the Kemalist project was to transform Turkey from an Islamic, conservative, Middle East oriented society to a Western, modern, secular society. And I think that project had its own problems because it alienated... It alienated the pious people, it alienated different ethnicities like the Kurds. So the ruling party is the result of that alienation because they came to power saying that this is a country that is largely conservative and we represent the people. So they presented themselves as a bottom -up. And that's why they have been very successful. And over the years since they came to power, they managed to transform society. And that's why today we have those poll results that people identify themselves with their Muslim identity. That's a significant transformation. And I think... And your family's there.

00:29:02    SPEAKER_04
your family's there. So you were born there and your family's still there. Outside of the polling results, have you seen that as well as your family talked about the shift?

00:29:11    SPEAKER_00
I have. I'm from a family. My mom covers her head and she's a religious person but she's always voted for the secular parties and she is a big fan of the founding father. So her religiosity is more cultural and so it's not... it's not a type of political Islam in a way, because she thinks that politics is corrupt and you shouldn't really, religion should not be part of politics. But now they talk about, they see more people covering their heads, they see more people talking about Islam as the main marker of their identity. But I think this is also different. This is a different type of religiosity because now we have a large middle class. So the religiosity of the 1980s, 1990s, it was different. So those were the marginalized people who had been oppressed by the Kemalist secular system. Now they're driving fancy cars and women who are wearing the hijab, the headscarf, they go to France for fashion shows. So it's become a fusion of that consumerism and religiosity. So in terms of lifestyle, a woman like myself and a woman who is wearing a headscarf, in terms of lifestyle and the taste, they have become similar.

00:30:49    SPEAKER_04
Very different from Saudi Arabia, for example, which is much more conservative and now has recently...

00:30:52    SPEAKER_00
which is much more conservative and now has

00:30:56    SPEAKER_04
allowed women to drive, and it's changed how they can dress in public. So it sounds like Turkey's evolved in the opposite direction, always had sort of this conservative roots, but has been now showing it publicly, and you say connected to the large middle class.

00:31:11    SPEAKER_00
Yes, exactly. So religiosity is on the rise globally, so not just in Turkey, but yeah, Turkey is not an exception.

00:31:21    SPEAKER_04
You mentioned earlier about the underbelly of Erdogan's government. Who are the main trading partners for Turkey and what are those big industries?

00:31:30    SPEAKER_00
The European Union. It's the biggest trading partner. Turkey and the European Union signed a customs union agreement in 1995. So they have become very close trading partners. But under President Erdogan, especially construction companies, they have become very active. And after Erdogan came to power, although the roots of that go back to the 1980s and 1990s, but it became more of an important factor under his rule. So he made trade as an important component of his foreign policy, especially his Middle East policy. So for instance, on his official visits to countries in the Middle East, there were hundreds of businessmen who would accompany him. Because he thought, and I don't know if you're familiar with the social science literature that says if you trade an economy, tie countries and societies together and it decreases the likelihood of conflict. So I think he followed that logic. So he built very close trade and investment ties with the countries in the region. For instance, there are hundreds of Turkish construction companies operating in northern Iraq. There are hundreds in Africa. So trade and investment have become an important component of his foreign policy strategy. But these days, especially with the European Union, there are many problems. So I think that affects... the trade dimension as well.

00:33:20    SPEAKER_04
So you talk about the construction, a lot of projects that are happening in neighboring countries in the Middle East. Does that mean that there's a large pool of skilled labor in Turkey? You know, the university system is pretty strong there. In the US, we talk a lot about STEM programs. Do those types of science, technology, engineering, math programs exist in Turkey as well?

00:33:42    SPEAKER_00
No. And I think Turkey was on its way to get there, but not anymore because the country has become... So Erdogan, he is engaged in a social engineering project.

00:33:56    SPEAKER_00
engaged in a social engineering project. So he wants to raise a pious generation. So he wants to create or recreate the society in his own image. And to be able to do that, education is the key. So that's why education has become very ideological. For instance, first graders are learning about the term jihad in schools. And that wasn't the case when I was a student in Turkey. Kemalism, secularism, so those were the core issues that we used to discuss in schools. And now the curriculum has become much more Islamic. And with that, of course, comes a decline in the quality of education in science and math. And recently, Erdogan promoted local science. And there is no such thing. The very meaning of science is, it's global, it's universal. If there is a fact, so if science is, the main aim of the science is finding out the facts, there are not many facts. There might be different interpretations, but there are not many facts. So you cannot make science local. But now that's his vision. So that's why I'm... Sad to say this, but in terms of science and technology and the quality of education, there's been a backslide in that.

00:35:36    SPEAKER_04
Gunal, I wanted to close by asking a question about the migration of people in the region and those people leaving Syria. You've studied and I think you've written about this in the past. How many Syrian migrants have been living in Turkey? How has Turkey responded to the influx of people living at its borders now?

00:35:58    SPEAKER_00
Well, there are around 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. That's a large, very large number. And of course, one of the reasons is that Turkey shares a long border with Syria. And the second reason is that Turkey pursued an open border policy after the Syrian conflict, to its credit. And I think the Syrian immigrants, their conditions are not great, but I think they are far better than many other Syrians living in different parts of the region. And recently, President Erdogan, for his own political calculations, but still I give credit to him for doing that, he has granted citizenship to 500 ,000 Syrian refugees. Of course, the expectation there is... that once they become citizens, they will vote for Erdoğan. But still, I think that's a major step in terms of improving the lives of those people. Because once you become a citizen, obviously, you benefit from the health and the education and everything else that the state is offering. The state has done a decent job in terms of accepting and trying to integrate them into the whole society. But like everywhere else, there is a nationalist backlash and societal tension is mounting. Especially in the border towns which host larger Syrian immigrant communities. We see the violence is increasing. There are an increasing number of attacks against the Syrian refugees. And the people, in public opinion surveys, they identify the Syrian refugees as the number one threat to the economy, to the security. And it's difficult to contain that. And I think that's why Erdogan is now talking about sending back those 3 million refugees back into Syria. And he talked about that in length, arguing that we are capturing territory in Syria so that we will create safe havens and so that these people can return their homes.

00:38:24    SPEAKER_04
Where would you recommend that members of the civil affairs community or anyone else listening to this episode should go for additional resources or updates about what's happening in Turkey?

00:38:35    SPEAKER_00
Well, Brookings Institute is a great think tank, and they have a very good Turkey program. Dr. Kemal Kirişçi, he's a very well -respected Turkish academic, and he is leading the program there, so I think he would be a great resource.

00:38:53    SPEAKER_04
Fantastic. Gönül Till from the Middle East Institute, thank you very much for your time.

00:38:57    SPEAKER_00
My pleasure, thank you.

00:39:22    SPEAKER_04
Thank you for spending some time with us. Please subscribe and come back for another installment of 1CA. Until then, be safe and secure the victory.