181: Proxy Wars, by Pawel Bernat, Juneyt Gurer, and Cyprian Kozera

Today Assad Raza hosts Pawel Bernat, Juneyt Gurer, and Cyprian Kozera, authors of Proxy Wars From a Global Perspective: Non-State Actors and Armed Conflicts: https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/proxy-wars-from-a-global-perspective-9781350369283/

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One CA is a product of the civil affairs association 

and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership.

We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations. 

To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com

or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org

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Special thanks to Rajhesh Vaidhya and Bengaluru Ganesh Utsava for the audio sample. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_iVM-6z2j4

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Credits

Sponsor: Civil Affairs Association

Host: Assad Raza

Showrunner / editor: Jack Gaines

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00:00:00    Introduction
A quick note, the guests on today's show represent themselves and their book and no other organization. Enjoy the show. Welcome to the 1CA podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes.

00:00:45    ASSAD RAZA
Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. I'm your host, Assad Raza, and our guests today are Pavel Bernat, Junaid Guerrero, and Saiprin Cozada, authors of The Proxy Wars from a Global Perspective. First, congratulations, and thank you for taking the time to talk about your book with our audience today. Thank you, Asad. Thank you, Asad. So, what motivated you to write a book on proxy wars and non -state actors in armed conflicts? Who'd like to start? Cyprian? Yeah.

00:01:10    CYPRIAN KOZERA
It pays back to some gloomy January. Syvasa Center organized a great meeting. Cyprian said, hey, let's do something about that. Because this obviously merits deeper attention. And we started working. We got so inspired. We issued an academic special issue devoted to proxy forces. And then it was yet not enough. We still had more ideas. There were more people interested in the topic. After this academic general special issue, we decided, okay, we have to go on. And then we started to work on a book, starting with theory and history, and then goes into case studies in the last decade.

00:01:50    ASSAD RAZA
Thank you, Cyprian. Before we started recording this, we had talked about... You guys noticed that there was a gap within the literature and focused on some of the contemporary proxy wars versus some of the historical ones that had been written about years ago. Pawel, I know you wanted to talk about the evolution of proxy warfare. So there are so many people interested in proxy warfare,

00:02:09    PAWEL BERNAT
are so many people interested in proxy warfare, trying to understand and define what it actually means. We find ourselves in this very special time. On the one hand, we've got this interesting and needed concept of proxy warfare, but we have observed this gap of understanding what it is. And on the margin, we have to remember that it is very important not only to understand from this academic point of view, but this is crucial for policymakers. A theoretical material does not really provide proper answers to the current proxy warfare. Those traditional old definitions, they were coined during the Cold War era. Basically, you've got armed conflict, two superpowers. So, you know, NATO and Warsaw Pact. And they fight against each other indirectly. So using the territory of the third state, like Korea, Afghanistan. And then in 1991, things changed. The Soviet Union collapsed. And this very significant... geopolitical alteration started. So traditional old Cold War definitions did not provide enough exemplary power. So this is the theoretical background behind the book. What we wanted to do, we have invited specialists on different areas on the globe to provide the field data. So we, with the book, provide enough end -of -row material for future researchers and policymakers understanding proxy warfare.

00:03:52    ASSAD RAZA
Funny that you say that because I think the average person wouldn't put in consideration these shifts within the geopolitical aspect and the way it impacts the operational environment. So on that point to Juneyt, how is proxy warfare in the context of international relations?

00:04:08    JUNEYT GURER
The key thing for us today is to understand the changes in the strategic element. International relations perspective is the state objectives basically are critical, but other non -state actors matter, which means the proxy group may have something to say in that interaction. So let's look at this issue from a different perspective to give us some more explanation.

00:04:35    ASSAD RAZA
Thank you, Jeanette. Having the different perspectives contributes to the conversation and the academic rigor to understand these complex problems. specifically in proxy wars. Let's shift now to talking about the current situations. How do contemporary proxy wars and the participation of non -state actors contribute to global strategic competition? So I'll shift to Powell.

00:04:59    PAWEL BERNAT
So what I'm going to talk about is the Russo -Granian war from the proxy perspective, or how the proxies were created and used by the both sides. The first thing we should do here is actually to divide the time of the conflict. So you have this first stage between 2014 and February of 2022, and then the full -scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia. So in 2014, the Russian Federation annexed Crimea and started the occupation. There was some betrayal involved and the action was actually really well prepared. Russian troops in the skies were present there. This is a great example of efficient use of hybrid warfare because the level of disinformation was just enormous. This traditional fog of war, we had basically no idea what was going on. When we look to the Donbass region in 2014, this is actually very interesting because the Russian Federation created their own proxies. So obviously, before 2014, there had been many people living in Lugansk that were pro -Russian. So what Russians did, they created units from those regions and paid them to organize and to fight. So the proxies there, that actually were created by the sponsor state, the Russian Federation. The indigenous people were not the only ones involved. There were many Cossacks from Russia, there were some other ethnic groups from Ural, but there were also straightforward criminals invited and organized to conduct the basic fighting against the Ukrainian forces. But when we look at this from this global strategic perspective, obviously proxies are used by the sponsored state when the state doesn't want to take full responsibility. This direct involvement in the conflict, you use proxies to fight this fight indirectly. So with the use of intermediaries. And you can either use the existing forces or you can create them.

00:07:24    ASSAD RAZA
Pavel, thank you. One question when you were talking about Crimea and Russia's support to the proxy for the occupation or annexation, you were saying at the strategic level, state sponsors usually don't want to take full responsibility. So some of that responsibility shift to the proxy forces and how is that looked upon within the area that they're operating in?

00:07:45    PAWEL BERNAT
Sure. From the strategic perspective, that's very important to explain to the Russian society why this war is being fought. So the main argument that is actually being repeated by the Russian state propaganda over and over again has been these are our Russian -speaking people and we will engage. in order to protect them because the Ukrainian regime treats them badly. And to support this argument, you create the indigenous units who fight beside you for their freedom. So having proxies in the Donbass region, that strengthened this explanation and Russia behind this strategic move of actually going to war.

00:08:34    ASSAD RAZA
Thank you. So we'll shift now to talk about Russia's proxies in Africa. So type in.

00:09:03    CYPRIAN KOZERA
You don't need to involve a lot of resources to win with actors. And here I mean dislocating the Western powers, France, the US, from the Sahel and Central African Republic. So Russia not being able to counter the influence, use proxy forces to the point that the West still doesn't know what to do with that, how to respond. And is it warfare? That's a question I would like to raise here, because as Pablo started in this discussion, he introduced this issue of odd theories. The classic proxy warfare theories not really sit here nowadays, because in the classic theory, armed conflict, and then proxies. What happens now if you have hybrid warfare? Is it the fifth generation of warfare? It's so hard to define. Is it a complex or not? Are we waging war with Russia? Some sabotage is happening. And then with some assassination ordered by Russia in the Western countries, the West supporting Ukraine providing weapons. It's very hard to say. So even if we don't use the term proxy warfare, it's happening. Proxy forces are being used in Africa by Russia and strategic gains. So definitely proxy warfare. It's very efficient. in Central African Republic since 2008. In Mali, 2022. Burkina Faso, 2023. Niger, last month, when the Russian mercenaries arrived to Myanmar. And it was two days ago when we learned that the Russians moved into the very same base in Myanmar and standing outside the U .S. soldiers. The U .S. troops are not any more welcome in Niger. They're moving out. moved out from Burkina Faso, French from Mali, with a hundred, a couple hundred, three hundred mercenaries, they entirely dislodged the Western forces. And with that, the influence. And now we are facing a U .S. troop leaving Chad, and we don't know where Chad will go in the next elections, which is on the 6th of May in two days. What about Senegal? the new president speaking of emancipation deals with anyone willing to enter the deal. So, looking from this perspective of the Sahel and the Sub -Saharan Africa, we see that there's plenty of proxy hybrid warfare, which brings enormous gains for a very little expense. Russia is the winner there, and we still don't know how to react.

00:11:50    ASSAD RAZA
Thank you so much. That was a really good description of how proxy war is used in global competition. Before we move on, I wanted to ask Junet if he has any thoughts on the role of proxy forces in global strategic competition.

00:12:04    JUNEYT GURER
The other thing about the strategic competition is this is a competition between US and China, and now China and Russia international order. But what happens, interestingly, after the conflicts? I think we will see a lot of organized criminal groups in this new era of strategic competition.

00:12:26    ASSAD RAZA
But I want to ask you, what are your thoughts about the intersection with such terms like insurgency or counterterrorism or terrorism? I am not an expert in that field,

00:12:36    JUNEYT GURER
that field, but I have some experience actually working with my colleagues here at the Marshall Center. Interesting topic. What I would basically say, if we consider the new... international security domain that will shape around the strategic competition. We have to look at those definitions of groups or tactics from that perspective. It is a critical time right now, and we all agree after Russia attacked Ukraine in 2022, now we are in a new international security era. So that era requires us to focus on the outcomes. I think those should be the real questions.

00:13:18    ASSAD RAZA
So earlier in the conversation, we talked a little bit about ethical considerations. So what are some of the ethical considerations surrounding the use of proxy forces in armed conflicts? There is a plethora of issues that could be addressed here.

00:13:29    PAWEL BERNAT
is a plethora of issues that could be addressed here. But very briefly and generally speaking, we have observed certain negativity linked to proxy warfare. So there is this pejorative undertone to it. And I think it actually stems from this Cold War era understanding. So basically you had two superpowers fighting against one another on the territory of another country, using this country for their struggle in order to avoid mutual assured destruction. You used the country, but also the people living in it. So this is my hypothesis. That's why this pejorative undertone linked to proxy warfare comes from. If you want to be academically honest, proxy war, it is not the case where the sponsor state uses some proxies to do their dirty work and the state does not want to break international law. So they use some forces to do that for them in order to achieve those strategic goals. But proxy warfare in itself is not. a negative thing so this is neutral okay but it also could be positive so this is something that i'd like the circle of the people working on it but also the republic to understand and remember we've seen not only the states but also a whole number of ngos but also private companies and informal groups participating by providing data by hacking the russian infrastructure so this is obviously manifestation of proxy warfare that proxies don't have to be military organizations. Very often they are, but they don't have to. That could be a very informal group of hackers that enters the stage of this armed conflict by, for example, hacking or providing some information. So in this sense, proxy warfare is not something ethically neutral.

00:15:33    ASSAD RAZA
You hit a lot of good things. I like the way you framed it. Is it being neutrally ethical, depending on the reasons behind the supports of some of these proxies, and the complexity behind it with the different actors that are supporting a proxy force? I like the example of the hackers. That was really good. I wanted to ask anybody else within the group, what are your thoughts on how proxy wars impact civilian populations?

00:15:55    CYPRIAN KOZERA
From a civilian perspective, we deal with countries, states, that have very limited resources. efficient states. And so they reach out to armed groups that are filling the vacuum left by the state. So the state is reaching to certain armed groups, supporting them if their interests align. And that's been happening in Maui for years since they're independent. And you're creating a local power. So you tip the balance between the state and the non -state actors. Then within these non -state actors, You also tip the balance because you're supporting one actor that is growing, that is getting stronger, receiving the funding, the equipment, the training, intelligence, you know, all that stuff. So that's a very risky situation. Because basically the state should have the monopoly on yourself of violence. That is not the case if you are supporting non -state actors. They come from the similar population. It may work short -term, but about long -term consequences. And then the people who have been trained, equipped, and bartered pardon, what should they do? Well, especially when they have no many options. They have no economic incentives other than smuggling, controlling minds. But at the end of the day, somebody will suffer from that, which we often see. non -state armed groups involved in conflicts and they pillage and they abuse local populations. And then there's also the issue with proxy actor getting so strong that it can threaten a fragile state. At that point, that a proxy actor is growing so much that it's threatening the balance, especially in an environment where all the actors are weak. So in proxy warfare,

00:18:00    CYPRIAN KOZERA
proxy warfare, you have to have your limits, and think long term. I will conclude here and end it over to the journey.

00:18:10    JUNEYT GURER
Thank you, Sibyl. I think you summarized many of the things that I was going to say. One thing we did not discuss a lot that needs to be also looked at is the non -state actors using proxies. So this is a secondary effect of the proxy use, which is very much connected to civilian populations. The examples that I have in mind is from the organized crime field. And we see a lot of groups in South America, when they want to do some business, not necessarily for states. In the case of drug trafficking, for example, they do use a lot of other groups. So that is basically the non -state actors working with other non -state actors. But when they connect themselves with a state that... issue becomes much more complicated so i think one key takeaway for us as security practitioners or professionals working in this field is to understand it from different perspectives and looking at the structures so if the state is working within proxy group i think it will be easier to handle the consequences that supreme was talking about how much power you are giving but Lose networks will be difficult to control and to know who you are working with. So that may have larger and severe consequences, whether this is related to human rights violations or any type of control issues. So another important issue, Supreme also mentioned, is you are investing time, money, and some tactics that you are using in your military or special operation forces. So obviously you are making some groups more powerful than they are, and you are giving them a new identity. So in the conflict environment, control of the groups is a lot different than after the conflict when you have the post -conflict reconstruction. So I think the proxy use should go beyond the conflict and all the Western democracies to make sure you are not creating next terrorist organization, or creating an organized crime group. So I think understanding the context, not only how to work with them, but how to deal with them afterwards, or making sure they're doing right things is important. So what these case studies told me, first of all, state and non -state interaction is complex. To my understanding, democracy matters. Democratic regimes or non -democratic regimes, they use proxies differently. So we need to expect new tactics or new type of groups, such as organized crime groups, coming into this proxy domain in the future. And responses basically require a complex set of expertise and strategies. So it is not a good idea to borrow some ideas from the previous era and say, hey, During the Cold War, proxy engagement was like this. And how states, whether these are Western states or not, they use proxies. This is exactly how it will be. I think that would be a mistake. And for the Western countries, my last point is, I think unity of effort and unity of resources is necessary to tackle counter -proxy efforts if you want to stop what China is doing or what Russia is doing or potentially can do. I don't think the state is strong enough or can counter the damage they can do to the Western system. That's why the unity of effort and resources are critical to be successful.

00:22:06    CYPRIAN KOZERA
Yeah, I doubt it. I think we skip the most important proxy forces. Oftentimes, responsibility approaches crimes. Proxies, like we've seen in Africa, they do. So that's also impacting the population. It's just the victim, like the crimes of the Wagner group with the top of the Mayan army committed in murder -killing rape. That was the proxy forces, the Wagner group, idea of counterterrorism. That's also the issue. So I just wanted to underline that. They don't have to, they don't care. And we've seen that they are business -oriented. And many, many cases testify to that.

00:22:52    ASSAD RAZA
Annette, thank you. Saperin, thank you. You guys brought up lots of several good points. Thinking about DDR and the importance of demobilization and reintegration of some of these proxies from a Western perspective and at times which I think it's overlooked or the conversation isn't in depth as it should be. And another thing I had written down was the use of non -state actors using proxies. I think something that's overlooked at times. I know you brought up the example of the cartels in South America. which is a good point. And I think that's something we take for granted and not really having a good understanding of the use of proxy forces. So Jeanette, Cyprian, Pavel, thank you so much for your time today. And again, congratulations on your book. Thank you.

00:23:31    Close
It's been a pleasure. Thanks for listening. If you get a chance, please like and subscribe and rate the show on your favorite podcast platform. Also, if you're interested in coming on the show or hosting an episode, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. I'll have the email and CA Association website in the show notes. And now, most importantly, to those currently out in the field working with a partner nation's people or leadership to forward U .S. relations, thank you all for what you're doing. This is Jack, your host. Stay tuned for more great episodes. One CA Podcast.